The US military is years behind Moscow in this new form of missile warfare
Nato foreign ministers are meeting in Brussels to discuss the rapidly escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict.
On the agenda, among other things, is Russia’s recent attack on Ukraine with an experimental new hypersonic missile, never used in war before. Neither the US nor the UK currently has the capability to shoot down such a missile. But what threat does the Oreshnik pose to Europe and the US?
Russia first launched the Oreshnik on Nov 21, striking a weapons production plant in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, in retaliation against Ukrainian strikes on a Russian military facility in Bryansk with US-supplied long-range ATACMS missiles. Following the launch, Putin threatened to target “military, military-industrial facilities or decision-making centres, including in Kyiv” with the Oreshnik, characterising such an attack as “comparable in strength to a nuclear strike”. President Zelensky’s residence and Ukrainian Parliament would be included under Putin’s definition of a decision-making centre.
The Oreshnik is unique. An arms-control treaty-breaking missile system, it is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) masquerading as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). ICBMs are designed to wage a nuclear war. The Oreshnik’s design is based on the RS-26 Rubezh, an ICBM, and its instrumentation (sensors, electronics, and the data acquisition capabilities installed on the missile) are those of the Rubezh. Flying at hypersonic speeds of Mach 11 (eleven times the speed of sound), the missile can carry either a conventional (non-nuclear) or nuclear payload. It is also a MIRV, or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, another signature of an ICBM. The Oreshnik fired at Dnipro carried six such warheads.
The range of this missile is between 500 km and 5000 km – enabling it to target most of Europe and the West Coast of the United States. Once launched, it can strike various targets in Europe, including Britain, in 12 to 20 minutes. In other words, the Oreshnik can do the job of an atomic ICBM, but without producing a nuclear mushroom.
Hypersonic missiles are nearly impossible to defend against because they fly many times faster than the speed of sound and, unlike ballistic missiles and slower cruise missiles, are highly maneuverable. Tracking this type of missile is highly problematic as it is designed to evade missile defence interceptors by continuously changing direction in flight.
The detection, characterisation, and tracking of an Oreshnik-type missile – a prerequisite for shooting one down – is also a very tall order. This is because early warning systems (a combination of satellites, hosted payloads in various orbits, ground-based radars, and various supporting computer software) are looking for so-called “signatures”, i.e. unique characteristics to a specific missile (shape, size, speed, heat/temperature, emissions, plume), to determine the type of missile fired. And since Oreshnik’s instrumentation is that of an ICBM, the technical means could interpret it as an ICBM.
Creating confusion – what the pre-eminent Prussian military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz called “The Fog of War” – is an integral part of Russia’s war-fighting strategy. The aim is to seek strategic advantage over the adversary by unbalancing him psychologically, while delaying and complicating his response.
By firing the Oreshnik, Putin sought to send a message to the US and Nato to stop arming Ukraine, without provoking a disproportionate escalation. To prevent a response to what could have been determined to be a nuclear attack, Moscow pre-notified Washington through a nuclear arms control channel prior to striking Ukraine with the Oreshnik. During wartime, if Russia and Nato were in a direct kinetic war, Putin would almost certainly not issue such an alert.
Russia’s growing arsenal of hypersonic missiles also includes the Kinzhal and the Zircon. As of December 2023, Russia also deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), operated by the country’s Strategic Rocket Forces. Launched from an ICBM, Avangard can carry a nuclear warhead. Once the HGV detaches from the ICBM, using its own propulsion system, it glides towards its target at hypersonic speeds, while conducting sharp horizontal and vertical evasive manoeuvres.
The UK currently has no equivalent to the Oreshnik, although the UK Ministry of Defence has a programme aiming to develop “future hypersonic concepts and technologies”. The first UK domestically-produced hypersonic cruise missile is not expected until 2030.
The United States is also behind Russia (and China) when it comes to hypersonics. In an effort to catch up, the US military successfully tested, after multiple delays, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), known as Dark Eagle in June, from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, in Kauai, Hawaii. A June Government Accountability Office report, however, blasted the Pentagon for using last-century’s engineering techniques in at least four of its six ongoing hypersonic missile development programmes. The target dates for the US military to field hypersonic missiles are between 2027 and 2029.
Russia’s hypersonic missiles, including the Oreshnik, pose a grave threat to the UK homeland and British Armed Forces as the country’s ballistic missile defence sensor capabilities are very limited. The Royal Air Force does operate an early warning radar at Fylingdales, which is capable of detecting objects 3,000 miles into space, but the facility is hosted by British personnel on behalf of the United States. The UK has no dedicated ballistic missile interceptor of its own.
Russia is highly unlikely to strike the UK with a hypersonic missile, outside of an ongoing direct kinetic conflict between Russia and Nato. Ultimately, however, without the threat of an in-kind retaliation, Putin cannot be deterred from using hypersonic missiles to target Europe until at least 2030.
Rebekah Koffler is a strategic military intelligence analyst, formerly with the US Defense Intelligence Agency. Currently a national security consultant and freelance editorial writer, she is the author of Putin’s Playbook; Regnery 2021. Her podcast Censored But Not Silenced is available on most social media platforms @Rebekah0132
Source: Telegraph UK
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